


European transport infrastructure policy – overview and challenges

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Agenda

- History of EU transport infrastructure planning
- Current scope of transport infrastructure planning
- Success stories
- Challenges
- Conclusions

Part I

History of EU transport infrastructure planning

Planning stage 1994

“Essen list”



TEN-T planning – 1994

Priority corridors/ projects by mode




- Projects decided on the EU summit in Essen in 1994
- Adopted by the European Parliament and the European Council in 1996

Source: Szimba 2008

Planning stage 2004

“Priority projects”



TEN-T planning – 2004

Priority corridors/ projects by mode



- List of corridors/ projects approved by the European Council and the European Parliament in April 2004
- Financial dimension of the planned investments (estimation 2004): 225 billion € up to the year 2020

Source: Szimba 2008

- The possibility of stimulating the participation of stakeholders
- Combining short-term and long-term infrastructure planning
- Allowing coherent infrastructure planning at regional level
- Taking into account the operating conditions for transport services

Sources: Reynaud et al. (1996), Chatelus (1999)

Planning stage 2004

‘Priority sections’ on ‘priority projects’


- Organisation of priority projects along ‘priority sections’, e.g.

P24, Railway axis Lyon/ Genova – Basel – Duisburg – Rotterdam/ Antwerp

- Consisting of following ‘priority sections’:
 - Lyon – Mulhouse – Müllheim
 - Genova – Milano/ Novara – Swiss border
 - Basel – Karlsruhe
 - Frankfurt –Mannheim
 - Duisburg – Emmerich
 - Iron Rhine (Rheidt – Antwerp)

Planning stage 2004


‘Priority sections’ on ‘priority projects’



Source: European Commission

Planning stage 2004

Overview of rail corridors



EU priority corridors, rail

with sections subject to infrastructure improvements

- P01 Railway axis Berlin-Verona/Milano-Bologna-Napoli-Messina-Palermo
- P02 High-speed railway axis Paris-Bruxelles-Köln-Amsterdam-London
- P03 High-speed railway axis of south-west Europe
- P06 Railway axis Lyon-Trieste-Ljubljana-Budapest-Ukrainian border
- P08 Multimodal axis Portugal/Spain-rest of Europe
- P12 Nordic triangle railway axis
- P16 Freight railway axis Sines/Algeciras-Madrid-Paris
- P17 Railway axis Paris-Strasbourg-Stuttgart-Wien-Bratislava
- P20 Fehmarn belt railway axis
- P22 Railway axis Athina-Sofia-Wien-Praha-Nürnberg/Dresden
- P23 Railway axis Gdansk-Warszawa-Brno/Bratislava-Wien
- P24 Lyon/Genova-Basel-Duisburg-Rotterdam/Antwerpen
- P26 Railway axis Ireland/United Kingdom/continental Europe
- P27 'Rail Baltica' axis Warszawa-Kaunas-Riga-Tallinn-Helsinki
- P28 'Eurocaprail' on the Bruxelles-Luxembourg-Strasbourg railway axis
- P29 Railway axis of the Ionian/Adriatic intermodal corridor
- sections subject to infrastructure improvements

Source: Szimba 2008

Part II

Current scope of transport infrastructure planning

Overview

Strategic, political and funding framework

STRATEGIC CONTEXT

White Paper 2011

POLITICAL FRAMEWORK

Revised TEN-T Guidelines
(Regulation No 1315/2013)

FUNDING FRAMEWORK

Connecting Europe Facility (Regulation No 1316/2013)

European Structural and Investment Funds

International Financial Institutions

Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance

White Paper (2011)

Roadmap to a Single European Transport Area



- Roadmap to a Single European Transport Area – Towards a Competitive and Resource-Efficient Transport System
- Key target: by 2050, achieve a **reduction of transport GHG emissions by at least 60%** with respect to 1990

White Paper (2011)

Selected targets


- General targets
 - Deployment of air, land and waterborne transport management systems (e.g. ERTMS)
 - Deployment of the European global navigation satellite system (Galileo)
 - Establish the basis for a European multimodal transport information, management and payment system
- Targets for 2030
 - 30% of road freight over 300 km should shift to other modes
 - Triple the length of the existing high-speed rail network
 - Completion of a fully functional and EU-wide multimodal TEN-T 'core network'



White Paper (2011)

Selected targets

- Targets for 2050
 - Complete the European high-speed rail network
 - Completion of the high-quality and capacity TEN-T network
 - 50% of road freight over 300 km should shift to other modes
 - The majority of medium-distance passenger transport is operated by rail
 - Connecting all core network airports to the rail network, preferably high-speed
 - Ensure that all core seaports are sufficiently connected to the rail freight and, where possible, inland waterway system



Dual layer approach of TEN-T planning

TEN-T Guidelines 1315/2013

- Core and Comprehensive Network
- The Core Network
 - Consist of those parts of the comprehensive network which are of the **highest strategic importance** for achieving the objectives for the development of the TEN-T network
 - The core network should constitute the **backbone of a sustainable multimodal transport network**
 - Should stimulate the development of the entire comprehensive network
 - It should enable Union action to concentrate on those components of the trans-European transport network with the **highest European added value**, in particular cross-border sections, missing links, multimodal connecting points and major bottlenecks
 - Implementation horizon: 2030

Dual layer approach of TEN-T planning

TEN-T Guidelines 1315/2013

- The Comprehensive Network
 - Consists of all existing and planned transport infrastructures of the TEN-T network...
 - ...and measures promoting the efficient and socially and environmentally sustainable use of such infrastructure.
 - Implementation horizon: 2050
- Specification of “core” and “comprehensive” infrastructure (links and nodes) in TEN-T Guideline 1315/2013

Core and Comprehensive Network

Rail



Source: TENtec

Core and Comprehensive Network

Rail + rail/road terminals + ports




Source: TENtec

Core Network Corridors



Basic features

- Nine Core Network Corridors (CNC), ERTMS and Motorways of the Sea
- Multimodal, involving at least 3 Member States
- Each CNC has a European Coordinator
- Support the implementation of the core network
- Synchronise investments in order to optimise network benefits
- Consultative Corridor Fora, with involvement of all stakeholders



Core Network Corridors

Example: CNC Rhine – Alpine



Source: TENtec

- Funding Framework 2014–2020, managed by INEA
- Covers three sectors: transport, energy, telecommunication
- Budget: 29.9 billion €, thereof 23.4 billion for transport (including 11.3 billion € reserved for Cohesion Member States)
- Budget mainly spent as grants, but also through innovative financial instruments
- Grants
 - Core Network (5% for cross-border comprehensive network sections)
 - Rail, Inland Waterways, Connections to ports and airports, Traffic Management systems, MoS, Road cross-border only
- Eligibility of financial instruments: all projects eligible under TEN-T Guidelines
- Annual/ multi-annual calls for EU-cofunding of infrastructure projects and studies

Draft concept for the new financing period 2021–2028

- Focus on decarbonisation, and making transport connected, sustainable, inclusive, safe and secure
- 60% of the budget to be spent on the construction of new infrastructure and 40% to upgrading existing infrastructure
- High priority to cross-border sections
- Integration of core maritime ports into the core network corridors, which are further aligned with rail freight corridors
- Overall CEF budget around 35 billion €
 - CEF Transport: 14.5 billion €
 - Cohesion Fund contribution to CEF Transport: 11.3 billion €
 - Military mobility: 1.7 billion €

Source: European Parliament (2020)

Part III Success stories

Success Story I

Improving rail terminal facilities at the Port of Venice

- Provision of additional facilities to enlarge the capacity for railfreight operations
- Construction of seven new parallel railway tracks and electrification of three railway tracks used for arrivals and departures
- Implementation period: 2007 – 2012


Source: INEA



Source: INEA

Success Story I


Improving rail terminal facilities at the Port of Venice



Source: Own synthesis, based on data by Port of Venice

Success Story II

Paris/Brussels/Köln/Amsterdam/London (PBKAL) high-speed lines



Project	Country	Opened
Channel Tunnel	France/UK	1994
LGV Nord	France	1993
HSL 1	Belgium	1997
HSL 2	Belgium	2002
CTRL I	UK	2003
CTRL II	UK	2007
HSL-Zuid	Netherlands	2009
HSL 3	Germany	2009


Source: Goldsmith & Boeuf (2019)



Success Story II

Paris/Brussels/Köln/Amsterdam/London (PBKAL) high-speed lines

Modal Split Paris–Brussels




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HSL-Zuid	Netherlands	2009
HSL 3	Germany	2009

Source: Givoni & Dobruszkes (2013)

Success Story II

Paris/Brussels/Köln/Amsterdam/London (PBKAL) high-speed lines




Source: Givoni & Dobruszkes (2013)


Success Story II

Paris/Brussels/Köln/Amsterdam/London (PBKAL) high-speed lines

Air traffic between Paris and London
(millions of passengers)



Air and rail cross-Channel traffic
(Eurostar) (millions of passengers)



Source: Ayoun (2008)

Part IV Challenges

Techno-economic and social challenge

Megaprojects – a few famous examples

- Brenner base tunnel
- Mont Cenis base tunnel
- Fehmarnbelt fixed link
- Stuttgart 21
- Rail Baltica
- HSR projects in Sweden
- HSR line between Madrid and Lisbon
- Øresund fixed link
- NEAT



Source: bbt-se.com



Source: femern.com

Techno-economic and social challenge

Megaprojects – What is a “megaproject”?

- Investment costs > one billion USD
- Subject to controversial debates and discussions
- Former and ongoing megaprojects have shown that transparency and involvement of stakeholders tend to be insufficient
- Involve (problematic) social and environmental effects
- Failing of megaprojects can lead to system relevant company and state collapses

Source: e.g., Flyvbjerg, Bruzelius and Rothengatter (2003)



Source: bahnprojekt-stuttgart-ulm.de



Source: Wikimedia Commons

Techno-economic and social challenge

Megaprojects – Observed challenges with megaprojects


- Systematical underestimation of costs
- Systematical underestimation of construction time
- Systematical overestimation of transport demand and thus benefits
- Actual magnitude of environmental impacts differs significantly from forecasted impacts
- Important impacts of a megaproject on regional, national or international developments do not materialize or are too diffuse to be scientifically verified
- Actual economic efficiency differs significantly from the forecasted economic efficiency

**Optimism
bias**

Sources: e.g., Flyvbjerg, Bruzelius and Rothengatter (2003);
Miller and Szimba (2015)

Techno-economic and social challenge

Megaprojects – Example: Stuttgart 21



Source: bahnprojekt-stuttgart-ulm.de

Techno-economic and social challenge

Megaprojects – Example: Stuttgart 21



Source: bahnprojekt-stuttgart-ulm.de

Techno-economic and social challenge


Megaprojects – Example: Stuttgart 21



Source: bahnprojekt-stuttgart-ulm.de

Techno-economic and social challenge


Megaprojects – Example: Stuttgart 21



Source: Own synthesis, based on various sources

Techno-economic and social challenge


Megaprojects – Example: Stuttgart 21



Source: Own synthesis, based on various sources

Geo-political and -strategic challenge

China – a new player in European infrastructure planning



Source: MERICS

Geo-political and -strategic challenge

China – a new player in European infrastructure planning

- Examples of involvement by China
 - Cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European Countries (“17+1 Initiative”)
 - Significant investments in the port of Piraeus by COSCO
 - Financing (not funding) of the upgrade of the rail line between Belgrade and Budapest by China
 - Development of multimodal logistic centers in CEE countries
 - Promotion and planning of large infrastructure projects (e.g., Helsinki–Talinn undersea tunnel by Chinese investor Touchstone Capital Partners)

Part V Conclusions

- TEN-T policy has played a crucial role for **integrating national networks** and has been an important facilitator of European integration
- Infrastructure planning along **international multimodal corridors** is an appropriate approach to develop infrastructure that meets the requirement of all concerned stakeholders
- The scope of the **TEN-T budget is restricted** in relation to the overall dimension of the investment plans (=> strong commitment needed by member states, infrastructure managers and private investors)
- Need to **align China's interests** in enhancing European transport infrastructure **with EU strategy** (facilitate a win:win situation)
- Need for applicants for EU co-funding: Make enhanced use of **scientific advice for the planning and implementation of megaprojects**, e.g.
 - Consideration of optimism bias in the planning phase (project appraisal)
 - Tighter risk management procedures, stakeholder involvement and a clear allocation of responsibilities in the planning and implementation stage

Thank you for your attention.



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- Slide 6: Chatelus, G. (1999): 'La méthodologie des corridors an Méditerranée occidentale – Quelles priorités pour les infrastructures régionales de transport au Maghreb?', Recherche Transports Sécurité 63, 2-27
- Slide 6: Reynaud, C., Chatelus, G. and Chouareff, F. (1996): 'Corridor Approach', Comité sectoriel des infrastructures de transport au Moyen Orient, Aman: REDWG..
- Slide 17, 18: Photo: TENtec Interactive Map Viewer, <https://ec.europa.eu/transport/infrastructure/tentec/tentec-portal/map/maps.html>
- Slide 20: Photo: TENtec Interactive Map Viewer, <https://ec.europa.eu/transport/infrastructure/tentec/tentec-portal/map/maps.html>
- Slide 19, 21, 22: Szimba E. (2008): Identification, Measurement and Explanation of Interdependence between Transport Infrastructure Projects – An Analytical Framework Applied to Priority Infrastructure Projects of the European Union. PhD thesis, Karlsruhe. Papers in Economic Policy Research, Vol. 25, Nomos-Verlag: Baden-Baden, <https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845207551>
- Slide 24: Photo: INEA, <https://ec.europa.eu/inea/en/ten-t/ten-t-project-implementation-successes/ramping-rail-terminal-facilities-port-venice>
- Slide 26: Goldsmith, H., & Boeuf, P. (2019): Digging beneath the iron triangle: the Chunnel with 2020 hindsight. Journal of Mega Infrastructure & Sustainable Development, 1(1), 79–93. <https://doi.org/10.1080/24724718.2019.1597407>, Photo: <https://ec.europa.eu/inea/en/ten-t/ten-t-projects/projects-by-priority-project/priority-project-2>
- Slide 27, 28: Givoni, M., & Dobruszkes, F. (2013). A Review of Ex-Post Evidence for Mode Substitution and Induced Demand Following the Introduction of High-Speed Rail. Transport Reviews, 33(6), 720–742. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01441647.2013.853707>
- Slide 29: Ayoun, P. (2008): Thematic Report of the French Airport Directorate. Ministry of Ecology, Energy, Sustainable Development and Town and Country Planning - Direction Générale de l'Aviation Civile – Direction Du Transport Aérien, 9, 30–33. www.developpement-durable.gouv.fr
- Slide 31: Photo 1: Tübbingfabrik Hinterrigger, BBT SE, <https://www.bbt-se.com/information/mediathek/#&gid=1&pid=43>; Picture 2: Femern A/S, Skyfish, <https://www.skyfish.com/p/femern>
- Slide 32: Photo 1: Arnim Klingus, Bahnprojekt Stuttgart-Ulm, https://www.bahnprojekt-stuttgart-ulm.de/no_cache/mediathek/mediaParameter/list/Medium/Fotos/ ; Photo 2: GRÜNE Baden-Württemberg, Wikimedia Commons, licensed by CC BY-SA 2.0, [https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Demonstrations_against_Stuttgart_21_\(2\).jpg#/media/File:Demonstrations_against_Stuttgart_21_\(2\).jpg](https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Demonstrations_against_Stuttgart_21_(2).jpg#/media/File:Demonstrations_against_Stuttgart_21_(2).jpg)
- Slide 32, 33: Flyvbjerg B., Bruzelius N., Rothengatter W. (2003): "Megaprojects and risk: an anatomy of ambition", Cambridge: University Press, <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107050891>
- Slide 33: Miller M., Szimba E. (2015): How to avoid unrealistic appraisal results? A concept to reflect the occurrence of risk in the appraisal of transport infrastructure projects. Research in Transportation Economics 2015 (49), 65–75, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.retrec.2015.04.007>
- Slide 34: Photo: Das Bahnprojekt Stuttgart Ulm (Broschüre), <https://www.bahnprojekt-stuttgart-ulm.de/mediathek/detail/download/das-bahnprojekt-stuttgart-ulm-broschuere/mediaParameter/download/Medium/>
- Slide 35: Photo: Bahnprojekt Stuttgart-Ulm, Stuttgart 21 | Neuordnung des Bahnknotens Stuttgart <https://www.bahnprojekt-stuttgart-ulm.de/baustelle/stuttgart-filder-s21/>
- Slide 36: Photo: Arnim Kilgus, Bahnprojekt Stuttgart-Ulm, <https://www.bahnprojekt-stuttgart-ulm.de/mediathek/detail/media/bau-des-durchgangsbahnhofs/mediaParameter/show/Medium/>
- Slide 39: Mapping China´s Belt and Road Initiative, Mercator Institute for China Studies, 2015